國際投資者重新看好中國經(jīng)濟(jì)
Investors walk back from the edge on China, but big risks remain
The terracotta army of China bulls is back. It is more than a year since the Chinese economy started to show a sharp turnround. At that point, investors were braced for an economic “hard landing” and a currency devaluation. The turnround since then had its most direct effect on the stocks of the western companies most exposed to China for their revenues, and on the prices of commodities that China buys.
看好中國的“兵馬俑”又回來了。中國經(jīng)濟(jì)出現(xiàn)急劇好轉(zhuǎn)跡象已有一年多時間。當(dāng)時投資者正準(zhǔn)備迎接經(jīng)濟(jì)“硬著陸”和貨幣貶值。自那以來中國經(jīng)濟(jì)明顯好轉(zhuǎn)，受影響最直接的是收入最依賴中國市場的西方公司的股票，以及中國購買的大宗商品的價格。
That sentiment has at last reached international investors. Last month, for the first time in three years, China enjoyed net inflows of capital, rather than outflows, according to the International Institute of Finance. China continues to dominate inflows to emerging markets. EM stocks are up 41 per cent since last January’s lows. Meanwhile, EM bond issuance hit an all-time record in this quarter while their currencies also enjoyed a great rebound, as fears recede that an “America First” US would inflict damage on global trade.
這種情緒最終傳遞到國際投資者。國際金融協(xié)會(Institute of International Finance)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2月，中國出現(xiàn)了資本凈流入而非凈流出，這是3年來的首次。中國繼續(xù)主導(dǎo)了新興市場的資金流入。新興市場股票與去年1月的低點(diǎn)相比上漲了41%。與此同時，新興市場債券發(fā)行量在本季度創(chuàng)出歷史最高紀(jì)錄，而它們的貨幣也大幅升值，原因是對奉行“美國優(yōu)先”立場的美國破壞全球貿(mào)易的擔(dān)憂消退。
These numbers ratify in cold dollars and cents a victory for optimists on China. In the very long term, it will grow; few deny that. But there are reasons to fear that the message about China’s latest credit-driven resurgence has been received just in time for that resurgence to peak and go into reverse.
這些數(shù)據(jù)實(shí)打?qū)嵉刈C明了看好中國人士的勝利。從非常長的時期來說，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)將會增長，很少有人否認(rèn)這一點(diǎn)。但人們有理由擔(dān)心，剛剛收到有關(guān)中國最新由信貸驅(qū)動的復(fù)蘇的信息，這種復(fù)蘇就已經(jīng)見頂并開始逆轉(zhuǎn)。
And the ever more urgent questions of recent years remain unanswered. Can China avoid the “middle income trap”, which has seen many countries reach about China’s current level of wealth and then stall? And can it somehow avoid all previous precedents for growth on so wide and rapid a scale and avert a “sudden stop” or financial crisis at some point.
最近幾年日益迫切的問題依然沒有得到解答。中國能夠避免“中等收入陷阱”嗎？“中等收入陷阱”已使許多國家達(dá)到與中國當(dāng)前相當(dāng)?shù)呢敻凰街缶屯磺�。它能以某種方式避免步所有那些如此快速而廣泛增長國家的后塵，防止在某個時點(diǎn)發(fā)生“驟停”或金融危機(jī)嗎？
The middle income trap is an acute one. Many countries have moved swiftly from being underdeveloped or poverty-stricken to gaining a middle income but in the last three decades only two countries with a population of more than 20m have managed to make the transition to “middle income”: Poland and South Korea.
中等收入陷阱是一個尖銳的問題。許多國家迅速從欠發(fā)達(dá)或貧窮國家轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橹械仁杖雵遥谧罱?span style="word-wrap: normal; word-break: normal;">30年里，只有兩個人口超過2000萬的國家成功地走出中等收入陷阱——波蘭和韓國。
Bulls suggest that China can get there. That was the central contention of a huge document Morgan Stanley published recently, with the unambiguous title “Why we are bullish on China”. If it can manage the transition from its current export-led economy to one built around domestic consumption, then the investment bank predicts that it can reach “high income” status by 2027, with average incomes rising from $8,100 now to $12,900.
看好中國的人認(rèn)為，中國可以走出中等收入陷阱。這是摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)最近發(fā)表的一份長篇報告的核心論點(diǎn)，該報告毫不含糊地以《我們?yōu)槭裁纯春弥袊?span style="word-wrap: normal; word-break: normal;">(Why we are bullish on China)作為標(biāo)題。這家投行預(yù)測，如果中國能夠從當(dāng)前的出口主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)向國內(nèi)消費(fèi)驅(qū)動型經(jīng)濟(jì)，那么它到2027年就能夠成為“高收入”國家，人均收入從當(dāng)前的8100美元增長至1.29萬美元。
The greatest risks to its scenario include a return to trade protectionism and China’s demographic issues as its population begins to age.
這一預(yù)測面臨的最大風(fēng)險包括，貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義回歸以及隨著中國開始老齡化而出現(xiàn)的人口結(jié)構(gòu)問題。
But can China avoid a financial “sudden stop”? China has pumped stimulus into its economy to a seemingly reckless degree. According to the New York Federal Reserve, the country accounts for half of all the new credit created in the world since 2005.
但中國能夠避免金融“驟停”嗎？中國出臺的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激方案達(dá)到了似乎不顧危險的程度。紐約聯(lián)儲(New York Federal Reserve)表示，在2005年以來的全球新增信貸中，中國占到了一半。
Symptoms of the imbalances that led to the Lehman debacle are already apparent: the most recent numbers on China’s housing market show new house price inflation running at 22.1 per cent over the past year in Beijing, and 21.1 per cent in Shanghai. And the $11tn market for “wealth management products” (WMPs), which invest in money markets to get a higher yield than on bank deposits, shows similarities to pre-Lehman financial engineering. Some WMPs invest in other WMPs, just as collateralised debt obligations used to invest in each other to create “CDOs squared”.
導(dǎo)致雷曼兄弟(Lehman)破產(chǎn)的那種失衡征兆已變得明顯：有關(guān)中國房地產(chǎn)市場的最新數(shù)據(jù)顯示，過去一年，北京新房價格上漲22.1%，上海上漲21.1%。規(guī)模達(dá)11萬億美元的理財產(chǎn)品市場顯示出與雷曼破產(chǎn)前的“金融工程”的相似點(diǎn)。理財產(chǎn)品投資于貨幣市場，旨在獲得高于銀行存款的收益。一些理財產(chǎn)品投資于其他理財產(chǎn)品，就像用債務(wù)抵押債券(CDO)互相投資，制造出“二次CDO”。
How can China escape its own comeuppance? The bullish Morgan Stanley view is that its debt is being largely funded domestically (or in other words “China is mis-allocating its own excess saving”). It remains a creditor to the world with a current account surplus, and does not face inflationary pressures, so that the central bank will be able to continue to inject liquidity to “manage any potential risk aversion in the domestic financial system”.
更謹(jǐn)慎的觀點(diǎn)來自牛津大學(xué)(Oxford university)中國中心(China Centre)的喬治•馬格納斯(George Magnus)。他指出，自2008年以來中國的金融體系已發(fā)生巨大變化，而且不健康。“金融體系資產(chǎn)（基本為貸款）已從GDP的大約250%增至2016年的440%。”
He adds that China’s “credit gap” (the deviation of credit growth away from its long-term trend) is, at 27 per cent, very high “compared with say, Japan, Thailand and Spain, which all opened up smaller gaps before they experienced financial crises, and subsequent deleveraging”.
他補(bǔ)充稱，中國的“信貸擴(kuò)張差額”（credit gap，信貸增速對長期趨勢的偏離幅度）為27%，“與日本、泰國和西班牙等國相比”非常高，“這些國家在遭遇金融危機(jī)以及之后的去杠桿之前都出現(xiàn)了較小的信貸擴(kuò)張差額。”
His sombre assessment is “the scale of the gap and the length of time it persists is positively associated with the onset of a serious financial crisis. The level of debt to GDP, variously estimated at between 260-300 per cent of GDP, the speed with which it has risen, and the eight or so years in which it has been continuing all make China a classic risk case for a fall.”
他的悲觀看法是“信貸擴(kuò)張差額的規(guī)模以及持續(xù)的時間與嚴(yán)重金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)是正相關(guān)的。中國債務(wù)與GDP之比（各種估計值介于260%至300%）、這個比率上升的速度以及8年左右的持續(xù)上升，都讓中國變成了一個經(jīng)典的危機(jī)風(fēng)險案例。”
China is now evidently attempting to apply the brakes gently, which will in turn mean lower levels of activity and lower commodity prices, yet international money has started to arrive.
顯然，中國現(xiàn)在正試圖溫和剎車，這進(jìn)而將意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)活動減少和大宗商品價格下跌，但國際資金已開始到來。
China’s economic model is very different from that of the US, and it is buoyed by far stronger growth. The temptation to extrapolate directly from the western crisis of a decade ago should be avoided.
中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式與美國迥然不同，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長強(qiáng)勁得多。應(yīng)避免直接按照10年前西方的金融危機(jī)來推測中國。
But the similarities in the underlying dynamics are undeniable and no issue is more important for world markets than China’s effort to avoid a similar denouement. For now, Chinese growth is a fact that has lifted many other boats around the world.
但基本因素的相似性是不可否認(rèn)的，對于全球市場而言，任何事情都沒有中國努力避免類似結(jié)局重要。目前，中國的增長讓全球很多其他地區(qū)水漲船高。
